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Abstract
This paper addresses the potential optimality of multiproduct clubs when the
joint cost function of such clubs exhibits economies of scope. On the one
hand, the joint provision of public goods in multiproduct clubs leads to cost
savings under economies of scope. However, there is an efficiency loss from
such clubs, since consumption group sizes cannot be set individually for each
good. In addition to formalizing these costs and benefits and deriving
conditions under which multiproduct clubs are desirable, the analysis
characterizes the equilibrium club configuration.

Economies of Scope and Multiproduct Clubs
by
Jan K. Brueckner and Kangoh Lee
1. Introduction
Local public goods in the U.S. are provided by a variety of different
governmental units. While the most visible public goods (education and police
and fire protection) are provided by school districts and municipalities
respectively, other less important goods are frequently provided by special
districts. The growth of such districts can be seen in Table 1, which shows
the total number of local government units by type in the U.S. in 1952 and
1982. While the decline in the number of school districts (which reflects
consolidation) is noteworthy, equally striking is the tripling of the number of
special districts between 1952 and 1982. Table 2 shows the types of services
provided by single-function special districts in the U.S., giving the number of
districts of each type. The most common special districts are those providing
fire protection (in sparsely populated areas), housing and community
development services, and drainage and flood control.
The creation of a special district reflects an attempt to provide a
particular public good to an optimal-size consuming group. With a congested
public good, this optimal size is achieved when the marginal benefit from cost
sharing equals the marginal congestion cost of accepting an additional person
in the consumption group. When the optimal group size for a particular good
(parks, for example) does not match the population size of an existing
governmental unit, creation of a special (park) district with different
boundaries may be desirable.
Although special districts allow great flexibility in the delivery of
public services, it is not necessarily efficient for each public good to be
provided by a different governmental unit. The reason is that many public
goods exhibit cost complementarities that can be exploited when the goods are
provided jointly by a single government. These complementarities can arise
from savings in fixed costs or from synergistic interaction between the
different public production processes. Police and fire protection provide a
good example. Sharing of communications facilities by a municipality's police
and fire departments leads to fixed cost savings, and the common service area
enhances coordination between police and fire units. Joint provision of
police and fire protection in most areas appears to be a consequence of these
effects.
In deciding whether joint provision of public goods is desirable, the
benefits from cost complementarity must be weighed against the efficiency loss
inherent in such an arrangement. This loss arises because joint provision
makes it impossible to separately adjust consumption group sizes to suit the
congestion properties of each public good. When congestability varies
significantly across public goods, this efficiency loss can be substantial. If
the loss is large enough to outweigh the gain from cost complementarity, then
the goods should be provided by separate, optimal-size jurisdictions.
Otherwise, the goods should be provided jointly by a multiproduct government.
The purpose of the present paper is to provide a formal analysis of the
trade-off between cost complementarity and efficiency loss in multiproduct
governments using a variant of the standard model of clubs (see Berglas and
Pines (1981)). To capture the notion of cost complementarity, the analysis
borrows the concept of economies of scope from the literature on contestable
markets (see Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982)). Introduction of this new
concept into the theory of clubs is an important contribution of the paper.
After discussing the normative question, the paper analyses the equilibrium
jurisdiction structure that emerges in the model under the assumption that
public goods are provided by profit-maximizing community developers.
2. The Model
For simplicity, assume that all people in the economy are identical in
that they have the same preferences and initial endowments. A representative
member's preferences are given by the well-behaved utility function U(za ,z^,x),
where z
a
and zu are consumption of two public goods and x is consumption of a
private composite good.
The two public goods may be produced either separately by single-product
clubs or jointly by multiproduct clubs. C(za ,zj3 ,n) denotes the cost of
providing public goods z& and z^ jointly to a multiproduct club of n people.
When za and z^ are produced separately by single-product clubs, costs are
C(z
a
,0,n
a )
and C(0,Zij,ntj) respectively, where na and iil are consumption group
sizes for type-a and the type-b single-product clubs. Note that the cost of
the type-a club, C(za ,0,na ), is obtained by setting zu = in the cost function
of the multiproduct club and replacing n by na , which allows the group size to
be chosen to reflect the congestion properties of z
fl
. Analogous comments apply
to CCOjZjjjnjj) . Since the cost of multiproduct clubs is C(za ,Zj:) ,n), such clubs
are forced to provide the the two public goods to the same number of people n
even if the two goods have different congestion properties. Congestion, of
course, implies that C is increasing in n. Per capita cost C/n is in addition
assumed to be a U-shaped function of n for (z
a
,z^) ^ (0,0). This guarantees
the existence of a finite optimal club size for any single-product or
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multiproduct club.
To address the potential optimality of multiproduct clubs, we introduce
the concept of economies of scope, which has been widely used in the literature
of contestable markets. With economies of scope, cost savings result from
joint production of several different outputs in a single firm. To adapt this
concept to the club model, it is necessary to consider an additional variable,
consumption group size, in characterizing economies of scope. Formally, we
define economies of scope for public goods in the two good case as follows:
Definition 1. There are economies of scope at output vector (z
a
,zb ) given
the consumption group size n if
C(z
a
,0,n) + C(0,zb ,n) > C(za ,zb ,n).
Analogously, weak economies of scope exist if the inequality is weak, and
diseconomies of scope exist if the inequality is reversed.
3. Single-Product Versus Multiproduct Clubs
In an economy consisting of identical people, an efficient allocation is
obtained by maximizing the utility of a representative individual,
U(z
a
,zb ,x), (1)
subject to the appropriate economy-wide resource constraint. This constraint
depends upon the form of clubs providing the two public goods z
a
and z^. With
multiproduct clubs, the resource constraint is written as
Nx + (N/n)C(z
a
,zb ,n) = NI, (2)
where N is the total population and I is the endowment of a representative
individual. The constraint (2) states that total consumption of the private
good and total cost of providing public goods equals the total endowment in the
economy. On the other hand, if z& and zb are produced separately by single-
product clubs, the resource constraint becomes
Nx + (N/na )C(za ,0,na ) + (N/nb )C(0,
z
b ,nb ) = NI
.
(3)
Note that the number of clubs in the two cases (N/n in the multiproduct case,
N/n
a
and N/nb in the single-product case) need not be integer-valued. As is
standard, this problem is ignored.
The optimality conditions for the multiproduct clubs are found by
maximizing utility subject to the constraint (2). These conditions include the
Samuelson conditions for the public goods,
nU
1
/U3 = C 1 and nU2/U3 = C 2 , (4)
and the per capita cost-minimization condition
C/n = C 3 , (5)
where C = C(z
a
,zb ,n) and subscripts denote partial derivatives. Similarly, the
optimality conditions for the type-a single-product clubs include the Samuelson
condition
n
a
u l/u3 = cal (6)
and the per capita cost-minimization condition
<Vna = Ca3> (7)
where Ca = C(za ,0,na ). Analogous conditions hold for the type-b single-product
clubs
.
Letting * denote the optimal values of the choice variables, the maximal
utilities with multiproduct clubs and single-product clubs are u m =
U(z
a
' m
,zb
m
,x
m
) and u s = U(za
s
,
z
b
s
,x
s
) (superscripts m and s denote
multiproduct and single-product clubs respectively). Our task is to compare
u m with u s to determine which form of clubs is optimal. As a first step, it
is useful to ask which form of clubs yields higher utility given some public
good levels (z
a
,zb ). This question is the same as asking which form of clubs
costs less to a representative individual. To see this, note that um =
U(z
a
,zb ,x
m
) > (<) us = U(za ,zb ,x
s
) as x
m > (<) xs given (z
fl
,zb ). But from the
resource constraints (2) and (3), we have
x
m
= I - C(z
a
,zb ,n)/n (8)
x
s
= I - C(z
a
,0,n
a
)/n
a
- C(0,zb ,nb )/nb . (9)
Thus, xm > (<) xs for given n, na , and nb as
C(z
a
,zb ,n)/n < (>) C(za ,0,na )/n a + C(0,zb ,nb )/nb . (10)
To assure that costs are as low as possible, the group sizes in (10) must
be chosen optimally conditional on z
a
and zb . The consumption group size that
minimizes the per capita cost in multiproduct clubs is implicitly defined by
the optimality condition (5) as n = n(za ,zb ). Analogously, the na and nb that
minimize per capita costs in type-a and the type-b single-product clubs are
defined by the optimality condition (7) and its counterpart as na = na (za ) and
nb = nb (zb ). Thus, with n, n fl , and nb chosen optimally, the inequality (10)
becomes
C(z
a
,zb ,n(za ,zb ))/n(za ,zb ) < (>)
C(z
a
,0,n
a
(za))/na (za ) + C(0,
z
b ,nb (zb ) )/nb (zb )
.
(11)
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This inequality shows the trade-off involved in multiproduct clubs. With
economies of scope, by definition we have
C(z
a
,zb ,n(za ,zb ))/n(za ,zb ) <
C(z
a
,0,n(z
a
,zb ))/n(za ,zb ) + C(0,zb ,n(za ,zb ))/n(za ,zb )
.
But, we know that
C(z
a
,0,n(za ,zb ))/n(za ,zb ) > C(za , 0,na (za ) )/n fl (za )
since na (za ) is chosen to minimize the per capita cost of producing za in a
single-product club. Analogously, we know that
C(0,zb ,n(za ,zb ))/n(za ,zb ) > C(0,
z
b ,nb (nb ) )/nb (zb )
.
Thus, multiproduct clubs have gains from economies of scope as well as losses
from imposing a common group size for the two public goods, making the
direction of the inequality in (11) uncertain. Whether multiproduct clubs are
superior to single-product clubs given the public good levels (z
a
,zb ) depends
on the magnitude of economies of scope and the difference in the congestion
properties of the two public goods.
It remains to determine the optimal club structure when z
a
and zb are also
chosen optimally. A partial answer to this question is formalized in the
following proposition:
Proposition 1. Let na na ( za
S
)> nb ~ nb^ zb
S
)> and n - n Cza
m
,zb
m
)
denote optimal club sizes when z
a
and zb are chosen optimally under
single-product and multiproduct clubs. Then, multiproduct clubs are
uniquely optimal if
C(z
a
* s
,zb
* s
,n(z/s ,zb
*s ))/n(z
a
*s
,zb
*s
) <
C(z
a
*s
,0,n
a
*)/n
a
* + C(0,zb
* s
,nb*)/nb* (12)
and single-product clubs are uniquely optimal if
C(z
a
^zb
*m
,n*)/n* >
C(z
a
*m
,0,n
a
(za
*m ))/n
a
(z
a
*m
) + C(0,
z
b
*m
,
n
b (zb
*m
) )/nb (zb
*m
) . (13)
The first part of this proposition says that if the z levels that are optimal
in single-product clubs can be provided at a lower per capita cost in a
multiproduct club whose size is chosen optimally conditional on these z's, then
multiproduct clubs are optimal. The second part of the proposition is a
parallel statement for single-product clubs. To prove the first part of the
proposition, note that, from (8) and (9), xm and xs can be written xm (za ,zb ,n)
and x s (z
a
,zb ,na ,nb ) . Then, using (10), (12) implies that
. „s/, " „ *s „ * „ *\ s vmx" s = x5 (z
a
&
,zb
" 5
,na ,nb ) < x (za * ,zb
" 5
,n(za
s
,
zb
"*) ) . (14)
It follows that
*« *«; t
""'s n\iu* = U[z
a
"*,zb"*,x *] < U[za -,zb
" 5
,x
m (z
a
5
,zb
" s
,n(za
" 8
,zb
s
)]
< U[z
fl
*
ra
,zh
*
ra
,x*
m
] = u*
ra
,
(15)
enwhere x m = x (z
a
,
z
b
ra
,n ). A similar argument shows that u 5 > u wh
(13) holds. This proves the proposition.
While Proposition 1 is useful, it requires knowledge of the optimal public
good levels, (z
a
s
,zb
s
) and (za
ra
,zb
m
) . It is clearly desirable to make a
statement that does not depend on the location of the optimal z values:
Corollary 1. Multiproduct clubs are uniquely optimal if
C(z
a
,zb ,n(za ,zb ))/n(z a ,zb ) <
C(z
a
,0,n
a
(z
a
))/n
a
(z
a )
+ C(0,
z
b ,
n
b (zb ) )/nb (zb ) (16)
for all (z
fl
,zb ) and single-product clubs are uniquely optimal if the
inequality (16) is reversed for all (z
fl
,zb ).
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To prove the first part of this corollary, note that if (16) holds for all
(za ,zb ), then it holds at (za ,zb ) = (za
s
,zb
s ). This implies that the
condition (12) in Proposition 1 holds, from which it follows that u m > u s .
Similarly, if the reverse of (16) holds for all (za ,zb ), then it also holds for
(za
m
,zb
m
) • This implies that the condition (13) in Proposition 1 holds,
yielding u*s > u*m .
As is shown above, formation of multiproduct clubs leads to an efficiency
loss because consumption group sizes cannot be adjusted according to the
congestion properties of the individual public goods. When the congestion
properties (and hence optimal group sizes) of the goods are identical, this
loss disappears and multiproduct clubs are optimal. This notion is made
precise in the following corollary:
* * -kit
Corollary 2. If n
fl
= nb
= n anc^ there exist economies of scope at
(z
a
s
,zb
s
) given a group size n , then multiproduct clubs are uniquely
optimal.
To prove this result, note that the presence of economies of scope at
f tVg tVc , , , -/eft , ,(z
a ,
zb ") given a group size n means that
*-i /" WjH "Q WW x / TP7T . —. , Wc r* 7TTf v , TC7C _ , _ 7fc WW v , TfTf , - _ NC(z
a
s
,zb
s
,n )/n < C(z
a
s
,0,n )/n + C(0,zb
s
,n )/n . (17)
But, since n does not necessarily minimize per capita cost in multiproduct
clubs, it follows that
C(z
a
s
,zb
s
,n(za
s
,zb
s ))/n(z
a
s
,zb
s
) < C(za
s
,zb
s
,n )/n . (18)
Inequalities (17) and (18) imply that condition (12) of Proposition 1 holds,
establishing Corollary 2.
To better understand the trade-off involved in multiproduct clubs, it is
useful to interpret the conditions stated in the proposition and the
corollaries more intuitively. To do this, we define the degree of economies of
scope and the efficiency loss from imposing a common group size as follows.
The degree of economies of scope at output vector (z
fl
,zb ) given a group size n
is defined as
h(z
a
,zb ,n) = [C(za ,0,n) + C(0,zb ,n) - C(za ,zb ,n) ]/C(za ,zb ,n) , (19)
The degree of economies of scope thus measures the relative increase in cost
that results from separating the production of (za ,zb ) into two single-product
clubs holding n fixed. Let H(za ,zb ) = h(za ,
z
b ,n(za ,
z
b ) ) represent the degree
of economies of scope at the optimal group size for a multiproduct club. Next,
we define the efficiency loss in multiproduct clubs as
A(z
a
,zb ) = nC(za ,0,n)/n - C(z fl , 0,na )/na j + (C(0,zb ,n)/n -
C(0,zb ,nb )/nb }]/[C(za ,0,na )/na + C(0,zb ,nb )/nb ] , (20)
where n = n(z
a
,zb ), na = na (za ), and nb = nb (zb ). The function A gives the
relative increase in cost that results from imposing the optimal multiproduct
group size on single-product clubs (note that A(z
a
,zb ) > 0). Using (19) and
(20), it is easily seen that if H(za ,zb ) > A(za ,zb ), implying that the relative
gain from economies of scope exceeds the relative loss from sacrificing
separate consumption group sizes, then the first inequality in (11) holds. It
follows that multiproduct clubs are superior given (z
a ,zb ) in this case.
Satisfaction of the reverse inequality means, of course, that single-product
clubs are optimal.
The trade-off discussed above is shown in Figure 1 for a given (z
a
,zb ).
The distances A and B are the minimum per capita costs of producing za and zb
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in single-product clubs. Analogously, the distance M is the minimum per capita
cost of producing za and zb jointly in a multiproduct club. Our question is
whether A + B > (<) M. To put this inequality in a more useful form, note
that the distance A - A is the efficiency loss from sacrificing the optimal
i
consumption group size for public good z
fl
. That is, A - A = C(z
a
,0,n)/n -
i
C(z
a
,0,n
a
)/n
a
. Similarly, the distance B - B is the efficiency loss for zb .
t !
The distance A + B - M is the cost saving resulting from economies of scope
i t
(A + B - M = C(z
a
,0,n)/n + C(0,zb ,n)/n - C(za ,
z
b ,n)/n) . Multiproduct clubs
will then be optimal for given (za ,zb ) when this cost saving exceeds the
» i t i
efficiency losses or when A + B -M>A -A+B -B. This inequality, of
course, reduces to A + B > M. Note that although Figure 1 illustrates the case
where n(z
a
,zb ) is located between na (za ) and nb (zb ), the general relationship
among the optimal n's is indeterminate.
4. A Special Parameterization
If we are willing to assume that economies of scope can be summarized by a
single parameter in the cost function, then more powerful results than those
derived in section 3 are available. In particular, suppose that the cost
function can be written C(z
a
,zb ,n,o) , where o is the (nonnegative)
complementarity parameter. A zero value of indicates the absence of
economies of scope, so that
C(z
a
,zb ,n,0) = C(za ,0,n,0) + C(0,zb ,n,0) (21)
In addition, C is assumed to satisfy
C (z
a
,zb ,n,0) < if za ,zb > (22)
C
a
(z
a
,zb ,n,0) = if za = or zb = 0. (23)
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Note that when either of the z»s is zero, as in (23), complementarity is not
operative and an increase in has no effect on cost. Together, (21)
-(23)
imply that
C(z
a
,zb ,n,a) < C(za ,0,n,a) + C(0,zb ,n,a) (24)
for a > 0, indicating the presence of economies of scope. Furthermore, it is
easily seen that the degree of economies of scope from (19), rewritten as
h(z
a
,zi_,n,o") to include the complementarity parameter, is an increasing
function of o. Thus, the size of is a direct indicator of the strength of
economies of scope as measured by h.
Since costs are independent of in single-product clubs by (23), it
JL, JL,
follows that the optimal single-product group sizes na and n^ are also
independent of o. Bearing this in mind, the following result can be
established:
JL
Proposition 2. There exists some critical a value o > such that
single-product clubs are optimal for < a < a and multiproduct clubs are
optimal for a > a . If na = n^ , then a = 0. Otherwise, d > 0.
This proposition says that there is some critical magnitude of economies of
scope beyond which the gains from cost complementarity outweigh the efficiency
loss from a common group size, making multiproduct clubs optimal. When the
scope effect is weaker than this critical value, the efficiency loss dominates
and single-product clubs are optimal. The proposition is proved by a simple
application of the envelope theorem to the Lagrangean expressions of the
single-product and multiproduct club optimization problems. Viewing the
optimal values of the choice variables in the two problems as functions of a,
12
the utility differential between multiproduct clubs and single-product clubs
can be written
D(o) ^ U(za
*m
,zb
*
ra
,x*
m
) - U(za
* s
,zb
*s
,x*
s ). (25)
Applying the envelope theorem, it follows that
d'(0) = n(N/n*)Co (za^zb
*m
,n*,0) > 0, (26)
where (J is the negative multiplier associated with the constraint (2). Eq.
(26) says that the difference between the maximal utilities in multiproduct and
single-product clubs is an increasing function of the complementarity parameter
o. In addition to using (22), this result invokes the assumption (23) that the
costs of single-product clubs are unaffected by an increase in a (this yields
JL
nb , then the maximal utilities are the same in both types of clubs when o = 0.
This follows because when economies of scope are absent and (21) holds, the
multiproduct club constraint (2) can be derived from the single-product club
constraint (3) by imposing the side condition na = nb . If this side condition
is satisfied at the single-product club solution, it follows that its
imposition does not change the value of the objective function, implying that
the maximal utilities are the same for both types of clubs (D(0) = 0). If, on
JL JL
the other hand, n
a ^
nb , then imposition of the side condition has an effect
and the single-product and multiproduct solutions differ, with the multiproduct
club utility being lower (D(0) < 0). Combining the above results, we see that
JL JL,
since D (a) > and since D(0) = when n
a
= nb , multiproduct clubs are
JL
optimal (D(a) > 0) for all o > 0, implying that the critical value o equals
JL JL I
zero. On the other hand, since D(0) < when n
fl ^
nh and D (a) > 0, there
13
exists some a > such that single-product clubs are optimal (D(o) < 0) for
all a below a and multiproduct clubs are optimal (D(a) > 0) for all a above
o . This proves the proposition. Note finally that in the case where n„ =
St
nb , Proposition 2 is a restatement of Corollary 2 from above for the special
parameterization.
5. Example
This section presents a concrete example based on the parameterization of
JL.
section 4. Since computation of a is not possible without specification of
the utility function, we instead take the approach of section 3, analysing the
choice between club types by comparing costs. Suppose that the cost function
is given by
C(z
a
,zb ,n) = ct aza + 6 az an
2 + abzb + 6bzbn
2
- oz
a
zb , (27)
where a-, 6- > 0, i = a,b. Note that this function is not always well-defined
since cost can be negative for given z values when a is large (or when the z's
are large for a given a). This fact will be taken into account below. In this
case, the per capita cost-minimization conditions yield
n
a
(z
a )
= (o^/Bg) 1 / 2 (28)
V zb) (<W 1/2 < 29 )
n(z
a
,zb ) = [(a aza + abzb - azazb )/(Baza + 6bzb )]
1 /2. (30 )
Note that the optimal n's for single-product clubs are independent of the z's.
Substituting (28)-(30) into (27) yields
C(z
a
,0,n
a
(z
a
))/n
a
(z
a )
= 2z
a
(a
a
6a )
1 / 2 (31)
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C(0,zb ,nb (zb ))/nb (zb ) = 2zb (ab6b )
1 / 2 (32)
C(z
a
,zb ,n(za ,zb ))/n(z a ,zb )
= 2[(6aza + Bbzb )(a aza + abzb - az^)] 1 / 2 (33)
Recalling the approach of section 3, our goal is to determine whether C a/na +
Cb/nb from (31) and (32) is greater or less than C/n from (33). Squaring both
expressions and simplifying, it is easily seen that, for given (za ,zb ), single-
product clubs cost more (less) than multiproduct clubs as
2 («a6 aab6b)
1/2
> (<) ab6a + a a6b " °( 6aza + 6bzb)' < 34 )
The key to evaluating (34) is to use (28) and (29) and note that cxbJ3a + a aflb
equals the term on the LHS when na (za ) = nb (zb ) and exceeds this term
otherwise. This follows because squaring the two expressions and subtracting
yields (abJ3a + a aCb )^ - 4a a6 aabJ3b = (abBa - a aJ3b ) , which is zero when a a/Ga =
ab /J3b and positive otherwise. An implication of this fact is that the LHS of
(34) will be greater than the RHS (indicating the superiority of multiproduct
clubs for given (z
fl
,zb )) when n fl (za ) = nb (zb ) and a > 0.
It is clear from above that the direction of the inequality in (34) is
uncertain when a
a/#a f ob/6b . However, noting that the optimal public good
levels in single-product clubs (z^ s
,
i = a,b) are independent of a, the first
inequality in (34) will hold at za
s and zb
s as long as
a > [(ab6a + a a6b ) - 2(cc aBaabBb ) V 2 ] /(Baza
*s + 6bzb
*s ). (35)
Since satisfaction of (35) means that inequality (12) of Proposition 1 holds,
it follows that multiproduct clubs are optimal when the complementarity
parameter is sufficiently large. Note that while the result is similar, this
is not the same conclusion as in Proposition 2 since it is not true that
15
single-product clubs are optimal for a less than the expression in (35). It
also should be noted that an upper bound must be placed on o" given that
n(z
a
,zb ) from (30) is not well-defined for a arbitrarily large. For (30) (and
hence (35)) to make sense at (za
s
,zb
s ), a must satisfy the inequality
a < (a az/ s + abzb
*s )/z/s zb
*s
. (36)
Thus, for the optimality of multiproduct clubs to be guaranteed, must satisfy
(36) in addition to (35) (since the RHS of (35) is less than the RHS of (36),
such O's exist)
.
6. The Equilibrium Club Configuration
The purpose of the analysis in this section of the paper is to
characterize the equilibrium club configuration when clubs are organized by
competitive developers. The analysis, which parallels that of Berglas (1976),
is not meant to be realistic since developer-provided public goods are rare in
the real world. Rather, the purpose of the discussion is to see whether the
optimal club configuration emerges from decentralized behavior in an idealized
competitive world. The analysis first derives the features of single-product
and multiproduct clubs organized by developers. The discussion then identifies
the club configuration (single-product or multiproduct) that actually emerges
in equilibrium.
Consider the problem faced by a developer organizing a multiproduct club.
The developer charges a club entry fee denoted by P while choosing the public
good levels in the club and the size of its population. Suppose that the
developer wishes to guarantee a utility level u to his club members. Then P
must satisfy
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U(za ,zb ,I-P) = u. (37)
The developer's goal is to choose za , zb , P, and n to maximize the profit
expression
TT = nP - C(z
a
,zb ,n) (38)
subject to (37). It is easy to show that the first-order conditions for this
problem are the Samuelson conditions (4) and P - C3 = 0. The profit level
realized by the developer depends on the utility level u. Profit it can be
shown to be a decreasing function of u, and it can be shown that when u = u m
,
tt = 0. These facts imply that v > (<) as u < (>) u m . To see that profit is
zero when u = u m , note that P = C/n holds when tt = 0, so that the condition P
- Co = reduces to the per capita cost-minimization condition (5). Since the
Samuelson conditions also hold and since the zero profit condition together
with the budget constraint x + P = I implies satisfaction of the club resource
constraint nx + C = nl, it follows that the planning conditions and club
equilibrium conditions are the same. This means that the u value associated
with a zero profit equals u .
Now consider the problem of a type-a single-product club developer, who
charges an entry fee P
fl
while choosing the public good level z& in the club as
well as the size n
fl
of its population. In setting the levels of these
variables, the developer views the characteristics of type-b clubs (which are
chosen by other developers) as parametric. In this sense, the equilibrium
under consideration is of the Nash variety. If the developer wishes to
guarantee a utility of u
fl
to his club members, then z
fl
and Pa must satisfy
U(z
a ,zb ,I-Pa -Pb ) = ua . (39)
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where z^ and P^ are the parametric public good level and entry fee for type-b
clubs. The developer's goal is to choose za , Pa , and na to maximize profit
TT
a
= n
a
Pa
- C(z
a
,0,n
a ), (40)
subject to (39). The first-order conditions again yield the appropriate
Samuelson condition (in this case (6)) and Pa - 0,^ = 0«
Parallel analysis applies to the developers of type-b single-product
clubs. Viewing z
fl
and Pa as parametric, type-b developers choose z^, P^, and
n^ to maximize profit TT^ while guaranteeing a utility of u^ to club members.
In equilibrium, the utility goals of developers should be consistent, so that
u
a
= u^ = u, and profit should be the same for both types of clubs, so that TT
a
= TT^ = it. For given u, the Nash solution for z^, P-, and n^, i = a,b is then
determined by the four first-order conditions, the utility constraint, and the
equal-profit condition. It can be shown that the (common) profit level is a
decreasing function of the utility level u and that profit is zero when u =
*s 5
u . J
With the above background, we derive the club configuration that emerges
in equilibrium. Equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 2. An equilibrium of the model is a utility level Up and an
associated club configuration such that i) developers earn nonnegative
profit and ii) any club configuration offering u > ug has negative profit.
Under this definition, the following result can be established:
Proposition 3. When u m > u s
,
the equilibrium club configuration
consists of multiproduct clubs offering Ur = u m . When the reverse
inequality holds, the equilibrium club configuration consists of single-
product clubs offering Up = u s .
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This proposition states the important result that equilibrium in the model is
efficient. To prove this result, first note that any multiproduct club
configuration offering u ? u m cannot be an equilibrium. From above, if u >
u
ra then multiproduct clubs lose money. While profits are positive when u = u
< u ra , such a club configuration also cannot be an equilibrium because an
alternative multiproduct club configuration offering a u value between u and
u m gives a higher utility and earns positive profit. A parallel argument
shows that any single-product club configuration offering u ^ u s cannot be an
equilibrium.
With the class of potential equilibrium club configurations thus narrowed
to the zero-profit configurations, Proposition 3 follows easily. In the case
where u m > u s
,
the single-product club configuration cannot be the
equilibrium because there exist alternative multiproduct club configurations
offering u between u m and u s that earn positive profit. Similarly, when u s
> u ra
,
the multiproduct club configuration cannot be the equilibrium because
there exist alternative single-product club configurations offering u between
u s and u m that earn positive profit. This establishes the proposition.
7. Conclusion
This paper has drawn a connection between club theory and recent research
in industrial organization by analysing the optimality of multiproduct clubs in
the presence of economies of scope. The paper has shown that in deciding
between single-product and multiproduct clubs, the planner must compare the
cost savings from economies of scope to the efficiency loss from imposing a
common consumption group size on different public goods. While the equilibrium
analysis shows that the correct club structure emerges from the decentralized
actions of competitive developers, it is an open question whether public good
19
provision is organized efficiently in the real world. However, the fact that
public goods with obvious cost complementarities (such as police and fire
protection) are provided jointly while other unrelated goods such as parks are
often provided in separate jurisdictions is an encouraging sign. This pattern
suggests that even in the absence of a truly competitive environment for the
provision of local public goods, something close to an optimal jurisdiction
structure may emerge in the real world.
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Table 1
JL
Local Governmental Units in the U.S.
1952 1982
County 3052 3041
Municipal 16807 19076
School Districts 67355 14851
Special Districts 12340 28588
Source: 1982 Census of Governments
Table 2
Single-Function Special Districts in the U.S. (1982) *
Type Number
Library 638
Health 1226
and Hospital
Highway 598
Airport 357
Fire 4560
Drainage and Flood 2705
Control
Soil and Water
Conservation
Parks and
Recreation
Housing and Community
Development
Sewerage
Water Supply
2409
924
3296
1631
2637
Source: 1982 Census of Governments. Some district types are omitted.
C/n
C(z„,0,n
fl
)/n
0,zb ,nb )/nb
n
a(za ) n(za ,zb ) nb (zb )
Figure 1
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NOTES
* Professor of Economics and Ph.D. candidate in Economics respectively.
1. Township governments are omitted.
2. See International City Management Association (1977) for a discussion of
these gains.
3. It is worth noting that in their survey paper, Sandler and Tschirhart
(1980) suggest that the theory of the multiproduct firm could be used to
analyse multiproduct clubs.
4. This follows from a simple application of the envelope theorem.
5. The first claim can be proved by noting that the Nash solution is the same
as the solution for the problem of maximizing TT
a
subject to (39) and tt_ =
7Tl. Applying the envelope theorem to this problem shows that TT „ is
decresing in u. The second claim is established in a manner parallel to
the analogous claim above.
6. It should be noted that the above equilibrium concept can be criticized for
its notion of deviations away from the equilibrium. In an ideal
definition, a club configuration would fail to be an equilibrium when an
isolated developer could set up a profitable alternative club that would
attract residents and earn him a positive profit. Unfortunately, our
characterization of deviations away from a multiproduct club configuration
does not conform to such a definition (deviations away from a single-
product club configuration do conform, however). The problem is that,
given the Nash character of the single-product club developer's
optimization problem, interaction between developers is inherent in the
single-product club configuration. As a result, deviation away from a
multiproduct club configuration by an isolated single-product club
developer is not a well-defined action. To overcome this problem, we posit
that a club configuration is not an equilibrium when there exists an
alternative club configuration (rather than a single alternative club set
up by an isolated developer) that offers a higher utility and leads to
nonnegative profit. For this reason, equilibrium under our definition is
not strictly competitive.
22
Papers in the Political Economy of Institutions Series
No. 1 Susan I. Cohen. "Pareto Optimality and Bidding for Contracts."
Working Paper # 1411
No. 2 Jan K. Brueckner and Kangoh Lee. "Spatially-Limited Altruism,
Mixed Clubs, and Local Income Redistribution." Working Paper
#1406
No. 3 George E. Monahan and Vij ay K. Vemuri. "Monotonicity of
Second-Best Optimal Contracts." Working Paper #1417
No. 4 Charles D. Kolstad, Gary V. Johnson, and Thomas S. Ulen. " Ex
Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation:
Substitutes or Complements?" Working Paper #1419
No. 5 Lanny Arvan and Hadi S. Esfahani. "A Model of Efficiency Wages
as a Signal of Firm Value." Working Paper #1424
No. 6 Kalyan Chatterjee and Larry Samuelson. "Perfect Equilibria in
Simultaneous -Offers Bargaining." Working Paper #1425
No. 7 Jan K. Brueckner and Kangoh Lee. "Economies of Scope and
Multiproduct Clubs." Working Paper #1428



HECKMAN IXI
BINDERY INC. |^|
JUN95
r„„„,( T„ Pi™? N. MANCHESTERBound - o - leasr
INDIANA 46962

